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JUDGING THE JUDGES*
JAMES ANDREW WYNN, JR.**
I. AN INTRODUCTION
With the emergence of the United States as the dominant
superpower in the world comes a greater and more penetrating look at
our legal system. Across the globe, countries are now studying the very
foundation of our democracy:' a strong, respected, and effective judicial
system.'
From the recent promulgation of rules for military tribunals,3 to the
disposition of traffic tickets,4 these are exciting times to be studying law
in the United States. Indeed, one of law school's greatest gifts, for those
who want to accept it, is the opportunity for an intellectual
transformation.
By transformation, I do not mean what many law professors call
"sharpen[ing] the mind by narrowing it."5  Instead, the intellectual
transformation from student to lawyer is substantive. The student views
the law as an object acting upon society. The lawyer, however, views the
law from the inside out: appreciating how the law serves as the
foundation for our democratic society; understanding its precious
' This speech was presented at the 2002 Marquette University Law School E. Harold Hallows
Fellow Lecture, on April 10, 2002.
"" Judge, North Carolina Court of Appeals. B.A., University of North Carolina at Chapel
Hill; J.D, Marquette University School of Law; LL.M, University of Virginia School of Law.
The author gratefully acknowledges the research and assistance of his law clerk, Eli Paul
Mazur.
1. See, e.g., Symposium, The Judicial Observation Program for International Law
Students, Lawyers, and Judges, 20 PENN. ST. INT'L L. REV. 47 (2001) (describing a program
that introduces international lawyers to the American legal system).
2. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 78 (Alexander Hamilton) (stating that "the courts of
justice are to be considered as the bulwarks of a limited Constitution .... ).
3. Department of Defense, Military Commission Order No. 1 (Mar. 21, 2002), available
at http://www.lexnotes.com/docs/d20020321ord.pdf (last visited Feb. 2, 2003).
4. See, e.g., Angela J. Davis, Race, Cops, and Traffic Stops, 51 U. MIAMI L. REV. 425
(1997) (discussing the interaction between a driver's race and the relatively unchecked
discretion of police officers to stop motor vehicles).
5. Andrew J. Pirie, Objectives in Legal Education: The Case for Systematic Instructional
Design, 37 J. LEGAL EDUC. 576, 580 n.48 (1987) (crediting Samuel Taylor Coleridge with
creating the phrase).
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clockwork; and realizing how easily this clockwork can be damaged by
the mere "appearance of impropriety."
6
Today I am here to talk about the very essence of the law. An
essence that is, perhaps, so vital and integral to our system of justice that
it is not always discussed or addressed in the law school classroom. My
topic is "Judging the Judges:" How do we judge the men and women of
our judiciary?
I submit to you that judges are different from other political actors.
The judge has a duty to uphold the sovereign will of the people, as
represented in our Constitution and our laws, and not to satisfy the
popular will. With this in mind, how do we better ensure that those who
are selected to serve as judges possess integrity, experience, professional
competence, judicial temperament, and a demonstrated commitment to
justice for all? And, most importantly, how do we better ensure that
those who are selected possess the spirit of judicial independence?
Think with me for a few minutes about this topic and ask with me
the question: What is judicial independence? Then answer with me:
Why does judicial independence matter?
II. WHAT IS JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE?
Judicial independence has a unique meaning in our constitutional
democracy.7  Although today we will primarily examine judicial
independence within the context of state judiciaries, the American
concept of judicial independence is principled on the relationship
between the federal judiciary and the other branches of our federal
government.8 Judicial independence in the United States is premised on
6. See, e.g., Heather M. Clark, Note, The Supreme Court's Indecent Proposal: Repealing
the Honoraria Prohibition of the Ethics in Government Act of 1978, 87 CORNELL L. REV 1475,
1492 (2002) (noting that "[i]t is hard to imagine a situation in which a third party could make
payments to a judge without creating even the appearance of impropriety.").
7. The concept of judicial independence is embodied in the United States Constitution.
See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 78 (Alexander Hamilton) (arguing that the independence of
the judiciary is necessary to protect against legislative and executive encroachments on
individual rights); Stephen 0. Kline, Revisiting FDR's Court Packing Plan: Are the Current
Attacks on Judicial Independence So Bad, 30 MCGEORGE L. REV. 863, 953 (1999) (noting
that the life tenure and salary protection provisions "cut at the very heart of judicial
independence embodied in the Constitution."). Moreover, the value of judicial independence
was recognized and protected by the first thirteen colonies in their selection of state
judiciaries. See, e.g., Luke Bierman, Judicial Independence: Beyond Merit Selection, 29
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 851, 853 (2002) (noting that the first thirteen colonies adopted
legislative or executive appointment to combat the fear of undue influence over judicial
decision-making embodied in the Declaration of Independence).
8. See Stephen G. Breyer, Judicial Independence in the United States, 40 ST. LOUIS U.
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understanding (1) the principle of dual sovereignty between federal and
state governments, and (2) that the power of the federal government,
particularly of Congress and the President, is limited by the
Constitution.
We live in a nation of many sovereigns. Between 1776 and 1791,
thirteen independent, though confederated, colonies existed on the
eastern coast of North America.9 The people of these colonies desired
some union, but they feared a powerful central government:' ° a
government that ruled with an iron fist from afar. The founders, fresh
from a revolution with England, knew tyranny; they had a sophisticated
sense of its many sources and disguises."
Consequently, the colonists created a federal government with
limited powers." The Constitution is the definition of our federal
L.J. 989, 989-90 (1996) (noting that the basis of judicial independence in the United States is
found in Article III of the Constitution, which guarantees judges lifetime appointment and
salary protections). Moreover, the foundations of judicial independence did not contemplate
a substantial interaction between the federal judiciary and state action. In fact, until the
Federal Habeas Corpus Act of 1867, a year before the enactment of the Fourteenth
Amendment, the federal judiciary did not even entertain petitions by state court prisoners
arguing that constitutional errors of procedure occurred during trial. Cf William J. Brennan,
Jr., Federal Habeas Corpus and State Prisoners: An Exercise in Federalism, 7 UTAH L. Rev.
423, 426 (1961) (arguing that the federal habeas statute was a response to Reconstruction
fears that the South would wrongfully imprison former slaves); accord Erwin Chemerinsky,
The Individual Liberties Within the Body of the Constitution: A Symposium: Thinking About
Habeas Corpus, 37 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 748,752 (1987).
9. One legal historian has described the period between the end of the American
Revolution and the ratification of the Constitution in this light:
The American Revolution ushered in a dramatic era in the rule of law. Building on
the emerging ideas of liberty and democracy, thirteen independent colonies in
America cast off the yoke of the British crown and adopted a new legal system to
regulate independent states with widely different social and political views. The
people who adopted the Constitution agreed that it was necessary that many rights
of sovereignty had to be ceded to a central government strong enough to execute its
own laws by its own tribunals.
Benjamin B. Ferencz, International Criminal Courts: The Legacy of Nuremberg, 10 PACE L.
REV. 203,205 (1998).
10. THE FEDERALIST NO. 45 (James Madison) (responding to the anti-federalist
critique that a strong federal government would soon resemble the tyranny of England).
11. For instance, in the Declaration of Independence, Thomas Jefferson indicted King
George III with interfering with the independence of the judiciary by making judges
"dependent on his Will alone, for the Tenure of their Offices, and the Amount and Payment
of their Salaries." THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE (U.S. 1776).
12. Federalist No. 45 is often cited to support the notion that the founders intended a
limited federal government. In No. 45, James Madison proclaims:
The powers delegated by the proposed Constitution to the federal government are
20031
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government. 3 Neither the executive nor the legislative branch can act
without pointing to a specific constitutional provision justifying such
action. This follows because the Constitution is the sovereign will of the
people: a precondition to the very existence and power of the legislative
and executive branches. The Constitution is a compromise. A
compromise between the thirteen colonies that created our union and
our federal government.
Within this compromise, under this Constitution, the judiciary is an
intermediary between the people and the executive and legislative
branches. The judiciary, as envisioned in The Federalist, and as
reaffirmed by Chief Justice John Marshall in Marbury v. Madison," has
the duty of protecting the people from the arbitrary and capricious acts
of majoritarian rule that violate the Constitution." Accordingly, the
few and defined. Those which are to remain in the State governments are numerous
and indefinite. The former will be exercised principally on external objects, as war,
peace, negotiation, and foreign commerce; with which last the power of taxation
will, for the most part, be connected. The powers reserved to the several States will
extend to all the objects which, in the ordinary course of affairs, concern the lives,
liberties, and properties of the people and the internal order, improvement, and
prosperity of the State.
The operations of the federal government will be most extensive and important
in times of war and danger; those of the State governments in times of peace and
security. As the former periods will probably bear a small proportion to the latter,
the State governments will here enjoy another advantage over the federal
government.
THE FEDERALIST No. 45 (James Madison).
13. See, e.g., U.S. v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 552 (1995) (speaking for the majority of the
court, Chief Justice Rhenquist held that Congress exceeded its authority under the
Commerce Clause, noting: "We start with first principles. The Constitution creates a Federal
Government of enumerated powers .... This constitutionally mandated division of authority
was adopted by the Framers to ensure protection of our fundamental liberties." (citations
omitted)).
14. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
15. Alexander Hamilton noted that:
[The] independence of the judges is equally requisite to guard the Constitution and
the rights of individuals from the effects of those ill humors, which the arts of
designing men, or the influence of particular conjunctures, sometimes disseminate
among the people themselves, and which, though they speedily give place to better
information, and more deliberate reflection, have a tendency, in the meantime, to
occasion dangerous innovations in the government, and serious oppressions of the
minor party in the community.
THE FEDERALIST NO. 78 (Alexander Hamilton). This sentiment is particularly relevant
today. After the attacks on the World Trade Center, the legislative and executive branches
moved swiftly to avoid other acts of terrorism. Some of the most efficient mechanisms for
stopping acts of terrorism might be legislative enactments that legalize "racial profiling." See
Samuel R. Gross & Debra Livingston, Essay, Racial Profiling Under Attack, 102 COLUM. L.
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duty of the judiciary is not to our representatives in Washington, D.C.,
but rather to the sovereign will of the people-the Constitution.
Thus, the founders built a stool of government supported by three
equally important and powerful legs to prevent a new birth of tyranny.'6
The legs of the executive and legislative branches are supported by
popular election. The leg of the judiciary, however, is supported by a
"judicial independence" from popular will. The founders envisioned a
judicial system in a state of equilibrium with the legislative and
executive branches; for if the judiciary is weakened, the stool of
government falls into imbalance."
I return to the question: What is judicial independence? Well,
judicial independence means a judiciary free from partisanship, political
pressure, special interests, popular will, and, most importantly, a
judiciary guided by the sovereign will of the people embodied in the
United States Constitution and its Amendments. As the first canon of
the Model Code on Judicial Conduct provides: "Deference to the
judgments and rulings of courts depends upon public confidence in the
integrity and independence of judges ... [which] depends in turn upon
their acting without fear or favor. ""
III. WHY IS JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE IMPORTANT?
The judiciary has enormous power. In a civilized society, we, as
citizens, must trust judges with our own liberty. We promise to follow
the law; we are charged with breaking a law; and between our liberty
and the prison door is a judge. For your sake, you pray the judge is not
biased by a political party, popular will, pressure to solve the crime, or a
REV. 1413, 1413-15 (2002). However, these enactments, though efficient, are not necessarily
constitutional. See Liam Braber, Comment, Korematsu's Ghost: A Post September 11th
Analysis of Race and National Security, 47 VILL. L. REV. 451,478-90 (2002). An independent
judiciary, bound by the will of the people as expressed in the Constitution, rather than
political will, is more apt to abide by constitutional law than the fear of losing an election.
But see Korematsu v. United States, 319 U.S. 432 (1943) (where the United States Supreme
Court upheld the practice of Japanese internment as constitutional).
16. See Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 458 (1991) (interpreting the Federalist and
the judiciary's position within the Constitution's framework as standing for the proposition
that: "Just as the separation and independence of the coordinate branches of the Federal
Government serve to prevent the accumulation of excessive power in any one branch, a
healthy balance of power between the States and the Federal Government will reduce the
risk of tyranny and abuse from either front.").
17. See, e.g., Angela L. Beasley, The Ethics in Government Act: The Creation of a Quasi-
Parliamentary System, 5 WIDENER L. SYMP. J. 275, 277 (2000) (noting that the "[f]ramers of
the Constitution deliberately created three branches of government with equal power.").
18. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, Canon 1 (1990).
2003]
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'partisan lens" that is tough on crime. Instead, you dream of an
independent judge. A judge who will listen to your arguments, your
alibi, and apply the law, with its presumptions of innocence, to your
case.
Judicial independence is vital because when it is your day in court
you will look to the judge to protect your rights and not merely enforce
the representations of the state. When the son of a governor or the son
of a wealthy campaign contributor assaults your son or your daughter,
you will seek justice. At the gates of justice you will find a judge, and
you trust the judge to apply the same law to the Governor's son as the
judge would apply to your son. And if the judge fails, then society fails,
because you, as a reasonable victim, will seek justice by your own hand,
rather than by the hand of the law. Thus, from the trial-where the
judge decides restraints on individual liberty-to appellate judges-who
in stealth opinions effect the rights and responsibilities of citizens far
beyond the actual litigants-the decisions of the judiciary have a
cumulative effect of disavowing or creating equal justice under the law. 9
In the words of Supreme Court Justice Anthony M. Kennedy: "The
law makes a promise-neutrality. If the promise gets broken, the law as
we know it ceases to exist. All that's left is the dictate of a tyrant, or
perhaps a mob. "20 To be sure, judges are not expected to be Olympian
gods. Trust me: Being a judge does not mean never having to say you
are sorry. No one expects judges to be perfect. That is why there are
mechanisms to hold judges accountable. Rulings can be appealed; laws
can be changed; the Constitution can be amended; and, most
importantly, illegal activities and ethical violations can be punished.
Tennessee Supreme Court Justice Adolpho A. Birch, Jr., puts it this
19. Justice Hugo Black best articulated this role of the judiciary in Chambers v. Florida,
309 U.S. 227 (1940), where he held:
[A]II people must stand on an equality before the bar of justice in every American
court .... Under our constitutional system, courts stand against any winds that blow
as havens of refuge for those who might otherwise suffer because they are helpless,
weak, outnumbered, or because they are non-conforming victims of prejudice and
public excitement.... No higher duty, no more solemn responsibility, rests upon
this Court, than that of translating into living law and maintaining this constitutional
shield deliberately planned and inscribed for the benefit of every human being
subject to our Constitution-of whatever race, creed or persuasion.
Id. at 241.
20. Justice Anthony Kennedy, speech to the ABA Symposium on Judicial Independence
(1998), in ABA STANDING COMMITTEE ON JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE, REPORT OF THE
COMM. ON PUB. FINANCING OF JUDICIAL CAMPAIGNS at iv (July 2001)).
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way: "Judicial independence is the judge's right to do the right thing or,
believing it to be the right thing, to do the wrong thing."21 The point
Justice Birch makes is that judicial independence is not only consistent
with a democratic system of government, but is essential to its
effectiveness.
IV. WHAT THEN ARE THE GROWING THREATS TO JUDICIAL
INDEPENDENCE?
A. Campaign Contributions and the Public Perception
In the last decade, and especially during the last five years, there has
been a systematic infusion of money and special interest pressure into
the election of state supreme court justices. The infusion of money,
politics, and special interest groups into judicial elections has affected
the public perception of the judiciary."
Empirical research shows a tidal wave of money flowing into
judicial elections in amounts which dwarf money spent in the
past. In the 2000 campaign, state Supreme Court candidates
raised $45.6 million-a 61% increase over 1998, and double the
amount they raised in 1994. The average state Supreme Court
candidate in 2000 raised $430,529-and 16 of them raised more
than $1 million.'
Where does that money come from? Who has such a growing
interest in affecting who is in courts? Well, half of all donations, and
maybe more, "come from two sectors of society: lawyers and business
interests. " 24 The simple fact is that special interest entities are spending
millions to elect judges, influence decisions, and serve their narrow
interests.2' Many people, including scholars, believe that these interests
do not represent the best interests of the general public.26 And, as the
21. Linda Greenhouse, Judges Seek Aid in Effort to Remain Independent, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 10, 1998, at A20.
22. See generally William C. Cleveland III, Money and Judicial Campaigns, 68 DEF.
COUNS. J. 393 (2001) (noting that nine of ten Ohio residents and 88% of Pennsylvania
residents question the impartiality of judges who hear cases involving litigants who were
campaign contributors and believe that judicial decisions are affected by contributions).
23. DEBORAH GOLDBERG ET AL., THE NEW POLITICS OF JUDICIAL ELECTIONS 4, 8
(2002), available at http://www.justiceatstake.org/files/JASMoneyReport.pdf.
24. Id. at 9.
25. Id.
26. See JOHN HIBBING & ELIZABETH THEISS-MORSE, CONGRESS AS THE PUBLIC
20031
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cost of judicial campaigns skyrockets, judges are forced to raise money
like politicians. The unfortunate result, as shown by a national survey, is
that a majority of our citizens now believe that justice is for sale.27
It is baseball season in Milwaukee. Accordingly, a baseball analogy
is appropriate. Umpires are the trial court judges of the baseball
diamond. Now imagine if umpires were elected and forced to fundraise.
Like lawyers, major league baseball players would have a vested interest
to contribute money to the campaigns. Now, let us say your favorite
player came to bat and was called out on a questionable third strike.
How much confidence would you have in that call if you knew, or later
discovered, that the pitcher gave $10,000 to that particular umpire's
election campaign?
Most judges hold to the general philosophy that their duty is to
follow the law. That is a relatively easy task in instances where the law
is explicit, black-lettered, and judges are left with little discretion. But,
the most important cases consistently involve issues in which the law
supports both sides of a controversy. In these cases, the judge's
independence from the litigants and special interests is integral to the
integrity of the administration of justice. Indeed, it is the rare case,
particularly on the appellate level, that does not present law and facts
reasonably supporting a decision in favor of either side. Our system is
an adversary system. A system based on the idea that all litigants have a
story to tell. The one-sided case, the case that leaves the judge with
little discretion, is the rare case. Consequently, judicial character,
quality, and independence are vital.
Now, I have been a judge for more than a decade. I have been
involved in four statewide partisan elections. In 1990, I was elected to
fulfill an unexpired term. In 1992, I was elected for a full eight-year
term on the North Carolina Court of Appeals. In 1998, the Governor
appointed me to the Supreme Court of North Carolina. That same year,
I narrowly lost an election to retain my Supreme Court seat and was
reappointed to the Court of Appeals. In 2000, I won another eight-year
term on the North Carolina Court of Appeals. Contemporaneously, in
1999 and again in 2000, I was nominated for the Fourth Circuit United
States Court of Appeals. But as most of you know, the Senate never
ENEMY 63-64 (1995) (noting that 86% of respondents to a survey believed that special
'[ilnterest groups... are definitely not connected with ordinary people, even remotely.
Instead... these special interests are completely divorced from the public interest.").
27. See THE NATIONAL CENTER FOR STATE COURTS, HOW THE PUBLIC VIEWS THE
STATE COURTS 8 (1999) (finding that 78% of survey respondents believed that the decisions
of judges are influenced by campaign fundraising).
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acted on my nominations.
As you can see, I know personally the exasperation of running in a
state elective system and seeking a federal judicial appointment. Most
importantly, those experiences reaffirm my belief that most judges work
hard to be fair and impartial. But when Justice at Stake, a national
partnership dedicated to keeping courts fair and impartial,
commissioned a national public opinion poll, some of the results were
chilling. In particular, the poll indicates that about three out of every
four Americans believes that contributors to judges' campaigns get
special treatment in court. And get this-one in four judges agrees."
Quite simply, the issue is not whether judges are actually influenced
by special interests. Rather, the fundamental issue is whether people
believe that judges, sworn to protect their constitutional and statutory
rights, are making decisions with one eye on campaign donors and
special interests. The issue is the public's confidence in the judicial
system. The issue is the public's belief in the integrity of the judicial
system. The issue is the public's trust and respect for the decisions made
by our judges."
B. The Dirty Politics of Judicial Campaigns
Big money is flowing into judicial elections. Where does the money
go? Well, most of the money goes into the tools of the modern political
campaign: advertising, media, and consultants schooled in sound bites
and attack ads.31 Some legal writers have commented that, in a few
states, big money has transformed judicial races into dirt-ball political
campaigns. Empirical research also supports this position. The Justice
28. JUSTICE AT STAKE, NATIONAL SURVEY OF JUDGES FREQUENCY QUESTIONNAIRE
4 (2002) [hereinafter JUSTICE AT STAKE SURVEY], at http://faircourts.org/files/JAS
JudgesSurvey-Results.pdf.
29. Id.
30. Some scholars have argued that the concept of "judicial independence" is based on
public perception rather than "actual independence." See, e.g., Jack Van Doren, Is
Jurisprudence Politics by Other Means? The Case of Learned Hand, 33 NEW ENG. L. REV. 1,
6 (1998) (citing MARVIN SCHICK, LEARNED HAND'S COURT 186 (1990)).
31. JUSTICE AT STAKE SURVEY, supra note 28, at 10.
32. See Adam R. Long, Keeping Mud Off the Bench: The First Amendment and
Regulation of Candidates' False and Misleading Statements in Judicial Elections, 51 DUKE L.J.
787, 788-89 (2002). Long gives an example where, in a Louisiana Supreme Court election, a
candidate ran a newspaper advertisement stating:
JOHN DIXON DOESN'T THINK 20 STAB WOUNDS ARE ENOUGH .... On
appeal to the Louisiana Supreme Court, six Justices agreed with the death sentence.
ONLY JOHN DIXON DIDN'T .... HE DIDN'T THINK MORE THAN 20
20031
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at Stake Survey polled almost 2500 judges.3 3 The majority of America's
state judges say the tone and conduct of judicial campaigns has been
getting worse.3 ' And I can tell you, they are right.
When a state becomes a judicial battleground, televisi6n
advertisements are the weapon of choice. 5 In the 2000 campaign, for
instance, the citizens of Alabama, Michigan, Ohio, and Mississippi were
subjected to unprecedented "air wars" featuring more than 22,000
airings of campaign commercials. 6 Many of these commercials are
produced by the candidates, and they frequently focus on the
candidate's background and qualifications. Fair enough.
However, almost half of these ads came not from the candidates, but
from political parties and special interest groups who want appellate
courts sympathetic to their ideology or financial interest.3  These
outsider ads focused less on the candidate's qualifications and more on
slick sound bites and nasty attacks. In fact, 80% of special interest
advertisements attack judicial candidates.38 And even though judges are
not allowed to promise results in advance, most outside advertisements
try to signal candidate positions on issues, especially tort reform, crime
control, and family values.39
Although judicial campaigns are "nastier, noisier and costlier,""0 the
money explosion has not reached every state. ' But when the tidal wave
hits, it hits hard.42 Just ask the people of Alabama, where one supreme
court candidate raised more than $1.7 million. 3
So, here we are. Judicial independence is an important value
TIMES WAS ENOUGH TO JUSTIFY THE DEATH PENALTY. WHAT
ABOUT YOU? THERE COMES A TIME TO DRAW THE LINE. THE TIME
IS NOW.
Id.
33. JUSTICE AT STAKE SURVEY, supra note 28, at 1.
34. Id.
35. See Anthony Champagne, Television ADS in Judicial Campaigns, 35 IND. L. REV.
669, 670 (2002) (noting that "[tielevision has become the major venue for modern day
supreme court campaigns.").
36. GOLDBERG ET AL., supra note 23, at 13.
37. Id. at 14.
38. Id. at 17.
39. Id. at 13.
40. Roy A. Schotland, Comment, Judicial Independence and Accountability, 61 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 149,150 (1998).
41. See JUSTICE AT STAKE SURVEY, supra note 28, at 13.
42. As noted, for instance, total fundraising increased by 61% between 1998 and 2000.
See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
43. GOLDBERG ET AL., supra note 23, at 8.
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embodied in the Constitution. In the last decade, judicial campaigns
have resembled political campaigns. Americans believe judicial
independence is compromised with the interaction of the political and
judicial systems. Without public trust in the integrity and independence
of our judiciary, the stool of our constitutional democracy falls into
imbalance. Consequently, we must work towards dispelling the notion
that there are two systems of justice-one for the connected and
powerful, and one for the ordinary citizen who has little contact with
judges. We must attack the notion that justice is for sale.
V. WHAT ARE THE SOLUTIONS TO COMBATING THE ENEMIES OF
JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE?
Fortunately, there are a wide variety of reforms open to citizens and
legislators who want to help keep their courts fair and impartial. First,
some scholars want to eliminate judicial elections." These academics
point to the United States Constitution45 and the Federalist Papers,
46
which gave and supported the President's power to appoint judges for
life tenure upon confirmation by the Senate.47 The original thirteen
states also chose to pick judges through appointment, though the
appointments were sometimes made by the legislature.4 ' However,
although sound in reason, this argument is not even a part of the current
political debate.
In fact, the notion of appointing the state judiciary died with the rise
of Populism and in the era of Andrew Jackson's democratic rhetoric.49
Through the lenses of the populist reaction against elites as remnants of
British aristocracy, judicial appointments were increasingly viewed as an
insider's buddy system; an undemocratic, if not corrupt, entrenched
44. See, e.g., Mark A. Behrens & Cary Silverman, The Case for Adopting Appointive
Judicial Selection Systems for State Court Judges, 11 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 353, 356
(2002) (arguing that "elections are incompatible with proper judicial function. "); Symposium,
The Case for Judicial Appointments, 33 U. TOL. L. REV. 353, 356-57 (2002) [hereinafter
Judicial Appointments] (arguing that judicial elections compromise judicial independence .by
making judges responsible to popular will-the majority, rather than the sovereign will-the
Constitution).
45. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, art. III, § 1.
46. THE FEDERALIST Nos. 78-83 (Alexander Hamilton).
47. Judicial Appointments, supra note 44, at 356-57 (noting the constitutional debates
over appointment and the decision of the first thirteen colonies to appoint judges through
either the executive or legislative branch).
48. Id.; see also SARI S. EsCOVITZ ET AL., JUDICIAL SELECTION AND TENURE 4 (1975);
HARRY P. STUMPF, AMERICAN JUDICIAL POLITICS 158 (1998).
49. Judicial Appointments, supra note 44, at 358.
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system of power." To combat the entrenched political elite, populists
believed majoritarian elections were the answer.
Moreover, the move away from appointing and to electing state
judges coincided with the rapid growth of the American republic." By
1860, twenty-four out of thirty-four states elected at least some of their
judges,52 and between 1846 and 1912 every new state adopted elections
for choosing some if not all of their judges. 3
During the populist era, the election of judges took on a partisan
nature. According to some scholars, the populists believed that
partisan elections were the best way to get populist judges on the
bench.5 Nevertheless, by the end of the century the new Progressive
movement and an increasingly organized bar joined together in
opposition to partisan elections. 6 The progressives saw elections as
turning judgeships over to Tammany Hall-like political machines, which
held judges accountable only to the machine's leadership." The bar,
including the new American Bar Association, worried that forcing
judges to engage in party politics compromised judicial independence. 8
Many states responded by adopting nonpartisan elections, but of
course judges still had to campaign for votes. This provoked a further
50. Kelley Armitage, Denial Ain't Just a River in Egypt: A Thorough Review of Judicial
Elections, Merit Selection and the Role of State Judges in Society, 29 CAP. U. L. REV. 625, 630
(2002).
51. See infra notes 54-55 and accompanying text.
52. Shirley S. Abrahamson, The Ballot and the Bench, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 973, 979 n.21
(2001).
53. LARRY BERKSON ET AL., JUDICIAL SELECTION IN THE UNITED STATES: A
COMPENDIUM OF PROVISIONS 3-4 (1980).
54. Samuel Latham Grimes, Comment, "Without Favor, Denial, or Delay": Will North
Carolina Finally Adopt the Merit Selection of Judges, 76 N.C. L. REV. 2266,2272-73 (1998).
55. Peter D. Webster, Selection and Retention of Judges: Is There One "Best" Method?,
23 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1, 11 (1995) (citing Anthony Champagne, The Selection and Retention
of Judges in Texas, 40 Sw. L.J. 53, 64 (1986)). Proponents of judicial elections and the
populist method argue, however, that the populists chose judicial elections because it struck
the right balance between judicial independence and judicial accountability. See id. at 17
n.80. Moreover, the partisan nature of these elections has been justified on the grounds that a
candidate's political party is an information cue, giving voters an idea about the candidate's
ideology. Id. Furthermore, because the judicial candidate was required to have "party
support," some scholars have suggested the partisan nature of judicial elections provided a
"screening process," guaranteeing more qualified judges. See Judith L. Maute, Selecting
Justice in State Court: The Ballot Box or the Backroom?, 41 S. TEX. L. REV. 1197, 1204 (2000).
56. Judicial Appointments, supra note 44, at 360.
57. See id.
58. Michael W. Bowers, Judicial Selection in the States: What Do We Know and When
Did We Know It?, in 2 RESEARCH ON JUDICIAL SELECTION 4-5 (2002).
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reaction from legal luminaries like Roscoe Pound, President William
Howard Taft, John H. Wigmore, and Albert Kales, all of whom argued
it was time to reconsider the practice of appointing judges. 9 Pound
argued partisan elections had reduced respect for the bench because
judges were no longer admired as being above the political battle."
Accordingly, the debate had come full circle: from Alexander Hamilton
in The Federalist to Roscoe Pound in the American West.6'
From these legal thinkers, the most fundamental reform to the way
states select the judiciary was born: the Missouri Plan.62 In 1940
Missouri adopted a scheme whereby a commission, comprised of
lawyers, judges, and lay people, nominated a slate of three judicial
candidates to fill each vacancy.6 The governor then appointed one
nominee from the list to the bench. Once in office, the judge was
required to run in an unopposed retention election during the next
general election: the voters simply decided whether or not to retain the
judge." According to many legal scholars, the Missouri Plan created the
delicate balance necessary between judicial independence and
accountability.65 Today, nearly half the states use some form of merit
selection to pick at least some of their judges.66
As by now you can deduce, the debate over how to select state
judges is not new. The arguments, from Hamilton, Madison, and Jay to
Roscoe Pound and President Taft, have been the same. But as the
threat to judicial independence worsens, as litigants feel cheated in court
by the appearance of impropriety, as citizens and legislators wonder
what can be done, many believe that it is time to debate these ideas yet
again.
VI. How Do WE MEET THE CHALLENGES TO JUDICIAL
INDEPENDENCE?
For decades, anyone trying to replace a system of contested judicial
59. Judicial Appointments, supra note 44, at 361-62; Paul D. Carrington, Judicial
Independence and Democratic Accountability in Highest State Courts, 61 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 79, 93-94 (1998).
60. Judicial Appointments, supra note 44, at 361-62.
61. Bowers, supra note 58, at 4-5.
62. Judicial Appointments, supra note 44, at 361-62.
63. Id. at 362.
64. Id.
65. Id.; Abrahamson, supra note 52, at 979 n.26.
66. Judicial Appointments, supra note 44, at 362.
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elections has faced a stiff challenge. Although judicial elections do not
exactly capture the popular imagination, people are consistently swayed
by the argument: "[D]on't take away the right to vote." Yet, in some
states, turnout in judicial elections is as low as 13%. 7 Voters often
complain that they do not know enough about the candidates.8
Nonetheless, the simple fact is this: today, 226 years after America's
founding, about 87% of all state judges must stand for election.0
Accordingly, the task for those concerned about the rising threat to fair
and impartial courts is not to eliminate judicial elections, but to make
judicial elections better.
A. Proposals for Improving Judicial Elections
1. Improving Public Perception
Many judges, academics, and commentators have suggested
revisions and reforms to the existing process of electing state judiciaries.
These reforms traditionally include the following: (1) making judicial
elections nonpartisan; (2) lengthening the term of judges; (3) creating
public financing for judicial candidates; and (4) reforming various
methods of campaign finance.
Many legal commentators argue the move to "nonpartisan" judicial
elections is the first step in reform.7" Presently, seventeen states select
some of their judges through partisan elections.7 Partisan elections
encourage judicial candidates to curry favor with party leaders in order
to secure the nomination, and also encourages elected judges to resolve
political disputes in favor of their party. Empirical research supports
this position and suggests that judges elected under partisan systems
render decisions exhibiting a partisan tendency that cultivate their
constituency.72
67. JUSTICE AT STAKE SURVEY, supra note 28, at 4.
68. Id.
69. ABA Task Force on Lawyers' Political Contributions, Report Part 11.2 (1998).
70. See, e.g., Charles S. Trump IV, The Case in Favor of the Non-Partisan Election of the
Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia, 2000 W. VA. L. REV. 24 (May 2000) (identifying
the arguments against partisan judicial elections).
71. Alabama, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Louisiana, Missouri, New Mexico (after initial
gubernatorial appointment), New York, North Carolina (recently the state legislature
eliminated partisan judicial elections. See infra note 81), Pennsylvania, Texas, and West
Virginia have partisan elections. Although Michigan and Ohio have a nonpartisan ballot,
judicial candidates are nominated through political parties.
72. Behrens & Silverman, supra note 44, at 277-78.
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Partisan judicial elections are clearly violative of the notion of
judicial independence. The idea that a judge should identify himself or
herself through the lens of a party platform is repugnant. As we have
discussed thoroughly today, the responsibility of a judge is not to
popular will, but rather to the sovereign will embodied in our
Constitution. I concur in the sentiment that nonpartisan judicial
elections are a requirement and a precondition to any meaningful
judicial reform.
One of the most oft stated and powerful proposals for judicial
election reform is lengthening the term of elected judges.7 ' By facing
fewer elections and enjoying more time between them, judges can feel
less special interest and fundraising pressure on the job." Moreover,
some commentators argue that lengthening judicial terms actually
increases accountability, as well as judicial independence, by creating a
"judicial record" to aid voter awareness." Some states provide terms of
ten, twelve, or fifteen years. 6 Massachusetts and New Hampshire
provide tenure until age seventy, and Rhode Island judges serve for life,
although judges in these three states are not elected to office in the first
place.
Public financing of judicial elections is also a common proposal for
mitigating many of the problems associated with special interest
pressure." As of the date of this lecture,79 Wisconsin is the only state
73. See, e.g., Elizabeth A. Larkin, Judicial Selection Methods: Judicial Independence and
Popular Democracy, 79 DENY. U. L. REV. 65, 85 (2001) (arguing that longer terms aid
independence and accountability by isolating judges from popular sentiment and creating a
judicial record subject to popular election); 3 REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION OF THE
AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION TASK FORCE ON LAWYER'S POLITICAL CONTRIBUTIONS,
Part III, at 4 n.1 (July 1998), at http://www.abanet.org/scripts.asp.
74. Larkin, supra note 73, at 85.
75. Id.
76. PHILIP L. DUBOIS, FROM BALLOT TO BENCH: JUDICIAL ELECTIONS AND THE
QUEST FOR ACCOUNTABILITY 28 n.78 (1980).
77. See AMERICAN JUDICATURE SOCIETY, JUDICIAL SELECTION IN THE STATES:
APPELLATE AND GENERAL JURISDICTION COURTS (2000).
78. See generally Charles Gardner Geyh, Publically Financed Judicial Elections: An
Overview, 34 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1467 (2001).
79. North Carolina recently passed the Judicial Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (Act).
The Act accomplishes four objectives of judicial reform. First, the Act changes judicial
elections in North Carolina from partisan to nonpartisan. Second, it gives candidates the
option of public financing in exchange for an agreement to limit campaign spending and
solicitation. Third, the Act lowers the campaign contribution limit from $4000 to $1000 for
candidates not participating in public financing. Fourth, the Act provides for the distribution
of a voter guide to educate citizens on candidates to the North Carolina Supreme Court and
Court of Appeals. See 2002 N.C. Sess. Law 158.
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that provides the choice of public financing to judicial candidates.'
Public financing mitigates a judicial candidate's need for private
funding, and therefore substantially mitigates the appearance of
impropriety." Moreover, because public financing is part and parcel of
"spending limits and ceilings," it reduces the amount of money available
in judicial elections, thereby substantially reducing the amount of money
spent on television advertisements and "dirty campaigning" tactics.
However, in Wisconsin this system has suffered from two procedural
limitations. First, voters are required to check a box if they want their
tax dollars to fund judicial elections."2 Second, some candidates have
opted out of the public financing. 3
Judicial campaign finance reform is yet another method of
mitigating some problems associated with special interest pressure.4 In
sixteen states there are no limits on how much one donor can contribute
to a judicial candidate. Even in the states with limits, the restrictions
allow for large contributions to judicial campaigns. For example, in
North Carolina each individual may contribute $4000 to a candidate for
the primary and another $4000 for the general election." His wife may
contribute a separate $8000 and so may each of his children. If
contribution limits were tightened, a single donor would less likely be
perceived as influencing the work of a particular judge.
Another approach is to improve the disclosure requirements of
judicial campaign contributions.86 Legal academics argue that disclosure
of a candidate's campaign contributors will apprise the electorate of the
candidate's possible biases. Moreover, disclosure will expose large
contributors to "the light of day" and accordingly mitigate the negative
effect judicial elections have on the public perception of fairness in the
80. See Roy A. Schotland, Financing Judicial Elections, 2000: Change and Challenge,
2001 L. REV. MICH. ST. U. DET. C. L. 849, 882-83 (2000).
81. See ABA COMM. ON PUB. FINANCING OF JUDICIAL ELECTIONS (2001) (noting that
public financing eliminates the appearance of impropriety).
82. Id. at n.174 (noting that the ABA commissioned a study which revealed that
"[t]axpayer participation ... declined from 19.9% in 1979, to 8.7% in 1998.").
83. Id. at n.176.
84. See generally Symposium, Judicial Elections and Campaign Finance Reform, 33 U.
TOL. L. Rev. 335-51 (2002).
85. North Carolina judicial election law has recently been amended, and now places a
limit of $1000 on individual contributions. See supra note 79.
86. Deborah Goldberg & Mark Kozlowski, Constitutional Issues in Disclosure of Interest
Group Activities, 35 IND. L. REV. 755 (2002).
87. Id. at 758.
[86:753
JUDGING THE JUDGES
judiciary." However, collecting campaign finance information can be a
matter of sorting through thousands of pages of documents-many of
which are vague about precisely how money is spent or by whom.
"Timing is the greatest problem, as many states do not release
information until after the election is complete." 9 Some day, I hope
sooner rather than later, this data should be provided to the public in an
easily searchable format, such as an interactive web site, that gives
voters complete and timely information on contributors.
In yet another variation, some states use judicial performance
evaluations as a mechanism of informing voters of a judge's past
performance. 9° Judicial performance evaluations survey people who use
the courts, including attorneys, litigants, police officers, jurors, and court
personnel.91 Alaska, Colorado, Utah, -and Arizona use evaluations and
seem to believe that these individuals are in the best position to measure
each judge's performance in areas such as integrity, impartiality, legal
knowledge, and administrative skills. 92 In 1985, the American Bar
Association adopted guidelines for evaluating judicial performance
under this system.93 However, this method has not been widely adopted
or applied.
Proponents of judicial elections also point to a collateral problem: in
many states where judges are elected, a significant number of
incumbents retire between campaigns. Consequently, governors end up
picking large numbers of judges instead of the electorate. 4 Given that
the turnout in judicial elections is often low,95 and that so many
judgeships are at issue, special elections may not be useful or cost-
effective.96 Instead, it might be useful to create a permanent selection
mechanism for interim appointments, so that vacancies can be filled
88. Id.
89. GOLDBERG ET AL., supra note 23, at 20.
90. See generally Penny J. White, Judging Judges: Securing Judicial Independence by use
of Judicial Performance Evaluations, 29 FORDAM URB. L.J. 1053 (2002).
91. Id.
92. American Judicature Society, Judicial Retention Evaluations Assist Both Voters and
Judges, at http://www.ajs.org/select7.html.
93. See ABA SPECIAL COMM. ON EVALUATION OF JUDICIAL PERFORMANCE,
GUIDELINES FOR THE EVALUATION OF JUDICIAL PERFORMANCE 11 (1985).
94. See Bowers, supra note 58, at 6-7.
95. See, e.g., Honorable Jay A. Dougherty, The Missouri Nonpartisan Court Plan: A
Dinosaur on the Edge of Extinction or a Survivor in a Changing Socio- Legal Environment?,
62 MO. L. REV. 315, 322-23 (1997) (arguing that voter apathy and ignorance results in low
voter turnout).
96. Hon. Daniel R. Deja, How Judges are Selected: A Survey of the Judicial Selection
Process in the United States, 75 MICH. BUS. L.J. 904, 906 (1996).
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quickly with high quality nominees.
Merit selection supporters, of course, believe that retention
elections-where an incumbent stands without an opponent and voters
decide whether to retain the incumbent-offer public accountability
with less hardball politics.9 7  Certainly, without an opponent, the
opportunity for mud-slinging, personal attacks, and dirty campaigns is
reduced. But many voters already avoid judicial elections, because they
say they do not know enough about the candidates to make an informed
decision.98 Without the contrast that a contest between two or more
candidates can provide, how is a member of the public supposed to
decide whether or not to keep a judge whose work is rarely a matter of
public attention?
2. Making Campaigns Cleaner
What about the judges themselves? How do we keep them from
running campaigns that tarnish our justice system? Like the candidate
in Texas who said: "If you elect me, I will never, ever, vote to reverse a
capital murder case."99 Or the Illinois justice who ran a television ad
that said: "Courts under Judge X sent innocent men to death row, while
killers walk the streets "-even though there was no evidence that Judge
X had any role in the wrongful convictions."
Most judges try to run clean campaigns. It seems to me, though, that
the local canons of judicial conduct need to be better promoted and
enforced. Citizen groups and the state and local bars could play an
effective watchdog role in holding judges to the standards they have
been sworn to obey.
VII. THE CONCLUDING ANSWERS: A FEAST OF REFORMS
There is much more that can be said, but the central fact is clear:
there is a growing threat to the perception and actuality that American
courts are fair and impartial. This threat, or perception, however you
are inclined to view it, is based on an infusion of money, special interest
pressures, and political campaigning in judicial elections. The threat has
97. See, e.g., Scott William Faulkner, Still on the Backburner: Reforming the Judicial
Selection Process in Alabama, 52 ALA. L. REV. 1269, 1275 (2001) (noting that "merit
selections.., undoubtedly remedy some of the problems of direct political involvement in
judicial elections.").
98. JUSTICE AT STAKE SURVEY, supra note 28, at 9.
99. Stuart Taylor, Jr., Gagging Judicial Candidates Won't Save State Courts, NAT'L J.,
(Mar. 25, 2002), at 836.
100. Id.
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not reached every state yet, and I hope it will not, but the nature of
special interest pressure is that it works to fill a power vacuum. Over
the last ten years, state judicial elections have become the battlefield of
choice for powerful special interest lobbies looking for new ways to
advance their political and ideological agendas.
There is nothing wrong with wanting particular policies or working
to see them enacted. There is nothing inherently wrong with
contributing to the candidate of your choice. There is nothing wrong
with working for what you believe is right. It is the American way.
However, the cumulative impact of special interest pressure on the
public's perception of judicial independence should signal to law
students and lawyers alike that something is wrong. Special interests are
lining up to enforce their visions of justice. More and more judges are
feeling the pressure. Fairness and impartiality are at stake. Justice is at
stake.
Unlike judges, legislators, presidents, and governors represent the
will of the people. Legislative and executive elections are designed to
match candidates with voters who share their views. Promises are made,
votes are exchanged, and accountability is secured by faithfulness to the
promises and a fear of unemployment. Judges are different. Courts are
different. They are created to arbitrate disputes without favor to one
side's wealth, viewpoints, or political connections. Given that the role of
the courts is different, should not judicial elections be different?
Some argue that popular elections keep judges, like executives and
legislatures, accountable. With an election, a citizen can check abuses of
power, ensure that the judiciary is operating within the mainstream of
jurisprudence, and exercise a right inherent in representative
government. To this sound argument I say: but do we hold elections to
decide who should win in court? Are there not other means of refining
the judiciary if necessary, such as constitutional amendment and
impeachment? Which system greater ensures an independent judiciary?
Before I close, I'd like you to consider the oath of office that every
federal judge swears to uphold:
I will administer justice without respect to persons, and do equal
right to the poor and to the rich, and that I will faithfully and
impartially discharge and perform all the duties incumbent on
me according to the best of my abilities and understanding,
agreeable to the Constitution, and laws of the United States. So
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help me God.''
And here in Wisconsin, judges promise to "support the constitution
of the United States and the constitution of the state of Wisconsin, and
faithfully to discharge the duties of their respective offices to the best of
their ability."" These words, it seems to me, provide a recipe for the
kind of judicial independence most Americans want.
There is a growing threat to fair and impartial courts. But
fortunately, there is a feast of reforms available to protect the courts
that protect our rights. My sense is that people of good will are coming
together, and not a moment too soon.
For in coming together on the importance of judicial independence,
we can hope to preserve what Chief Justice Rehnquist calls "one of the
crown jewels of our system of government"-a system of courts that is
fair, impartial, and independent. 3 Ultimately, the public's confidence -in
and respect for the fairness and integrity of the judiciary will be greatly
enhanced when they "Judge the Judges."
101. The Judiciary Act of 1789, § 8, available at http://air.fjc.gov/history/landmark
afrm.html.
102. WIS. CONST., art. IV, § 28.
103. See Linda Greenhouse, Rehnquist Joins Fray on Rulings, Defending Judicial
Independence, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 10, 1996, at Al.
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